We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in a Prisoners'Dilemma. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payo¤-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors coexist under a wide range of parameters. Two scenarios can arise. Either there is "full separation" of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two di¤erent, disconnected components. Or there is "marginalization" of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Our results are consistent with typical empirical …ndings on cooperation in networks.
Introduction

Motivation
One of the biggest challenges for economists, biologists, sociologists and other social scientists has been to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma situations. Many researchers share the view that interaction structure is crucial for the emergence of cooperation. 1 Interaction structure has been demonstrated to matter across a wide array of …elds and types of social behaviors. Examples are studies of cooperation and community enforcement in development economics but also studies of crime and drug use in law and economics. 2 Especially if the interaction structure leads to assortative matching it seems that there are good chances for cooperation to prevail. The underlying idea is that if cooperators interact with increased probability among themselves they can be more successful as a group than defectors. There are many empirical …ndings which show that there is indeed strong assortative matching in social networks. 3 Recent empirical …ndings on social networks have highlighted another aspect of the problem. In these studies it has been found that people who behave in a more altruistic or generous way are found to be more centrally located in social networks. 4 Hence there is a strong positive association between pro-social behavior and network centrality.
In most of these studies, however, the direction of the causality is unclear. Do agents become more pro-social because they are in a central position in the network or do they obtain this position because their behavior is more socially minded? Similarly, existing theories of assortative matching and group selection fail to answer the question of why interaction structures which favor cooperation should be more likely to emerge. In fact it is likely that there will be multiple feedback e¤ects between action choices and matching.
To capture these possible feedback e¤ects we present a model to analyze the coevolution of interaction structure and behavior which is based on a few simple principles. Still, the model is rich enough to endogenously produce assortative matching and to o¤er a possible explanation for why cooperation emerges and why agents displaying less pro-social behavior are often found at the periphery of social networks.
More precisely, we consider agents playing the 2 2 Prisoners'Dilemma game with their neighbors in an endogenous network. Agents are boundedly rational and decide on both action and linking choices by imitating successful behavior among their neighbors. Imitation is widely recognized to be one of the most important form of learning in humans. 5 We propose the following imitation learning rules.
Agents choose the action (cooperation or defection) with the highest average payo¤ in their information neighborhood.
They search new interaction partners locally using information from the agents in their information neighborhood. They are willing to create a link with another node if and only if the average payo¤ of the interaction neighbors of the node in question is high enough. 1 See for theoretical papers Hamilton (1964) , Myerson, Pollock and Swinkels (1991) or Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) and Grimm and Mengel (2009) for an experiment. 2 See among others Dixit (2004) or Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) . 3 McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) summarize the empirical literature on assortative matching in networks. 4 Christakis and Fowler (2008) study smoking in a large empirical network in the UK. Leider et al. (2007) , Goeree et al. (2008) and Branas-Garza et al. (2008) all study altruism experimentally (through a dictator game) after eliciting a real life social network. 5 For an experiment on imitation learning see Apesteguía, Huck and Öchssler (2007) .
Agents face a …xed capacity constraint. In this way, any existing link may incur an opportunity cost that, if high enough, will lead to its elimination and replacement by another.
An important aspect of such a model of local search is the amount of information that agents have. Indeed, we distinguish between the radii of interaction and of information of the agents, each given by a di¤erent parameter. The interaction radius delimits the set of other agents with whom an agent plays the game. Analogously, the information radius determines the set of agents about which an agent has information. These two sets need not to coincide, allowing us to cover a wide range of applications. A large information radius (relative to the interaction radius) can re ‡ect situations where relevant information travels easily through the network. Think for instance on the information about one's friend's friends or the gossip in a village about some distant neighbors. Situations where relevant information is hard to obtain are represented by a small information radius. Naturally, the smaller both radii are, the more relevant is the network for the outcome of the game and the learning process.
Given this coevolutionary dynamics, we analyze which states of the system are most likely to emerge in the long run. Our main analytical result shows that polymorphic states, i.e. states where both defectors and cooperators coexist, are stochastically stable under reasonable assumptions on the payo¤ parameters. The topology of the network in stochastically stable states can be of two di¤erent types. The …rst scenario, that we call "full separation"occurs whenever agents hold some information beyond their interaction radius. In this case defectors and cooperators are found in two disconnected components. One component consists of cooperators only, the other of only defectors. 6 The second scenario, that we call "marginalization" occurs if agents only interact with and hold information about their …rst-order neighbors. Then networks in stochastically stable states can display a unique polymorphic component. In such a polymorphic component cooperators are found in the center and defectors in the periphery. The linking dynamics in these cases do not lead to full exclusion of defectors, but marginalizes them by driving them out to the periphery of the network (see Figure 1 ). Our simple model of imitation learning is hence able to explain the empirical …ndings that there is strong assortativity in social networks and that agents displaying less generous or altruistic behaviour are more often found in the periphery of social networks. We then simulate the model to gain insight into the importance of di¤erent parameters of the model. Con…rming our analytical result, we …nd that polymorphic states do emerge. The share of cooperators in such states increases with the relative speed at which the network evolves (relative to actions). It increases with the radius of interaction and decreases with the radius of information. Thus, maybe somewhat counter-intuitively, we …nd that "less information"helps cooperation. Finally we also …nd that -consistently with empirical …ndings on social networks -our networks display high clustering coe¢ cients and short average distances.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we relate our paper to the existing literature. In Section 2 we describe in detail the model, the learning dynamics and the analytical tools used. In Section 3 we present our main analytical results. In Section 4 we present some simulation results. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are relegated to an appendix.
Literature
Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) have analyzed imitation of behavior when agents are located on a circle. They found that some cooperation in the Prisoners'Dilemma can survive. 7 The intuition is that -as agents can only imitate their interaction neighbors -defectors will end up interacting with defectors and cooperators with other cooperators. This reveals the social bene…t of cooperation and prevents that cooperators imitate defection. Mengel (2009) and also Goyal (2007) have shown though that this result is not robust. Firstly it does not hold if agents are allowed to hold some information beyond their interaction neighbors, secondly it does not extend to general networks and thirdly it is sensitive to minor changes in the imitation rule. 8 Under the general assumptions we use in this paper, action imitation alone thus cannot sustain cooperative outcomes (except for very particular cases). We show that if the network is endogenous cooperation will survive under many parameter constellations.
In recent years the coevolution of network structure and action choice in games has received increasing attention. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) as well as Jackson and Watts (2002) study the coevolution of linking and action choices in Coordination Games. Both rely on myopic best responses as learning dynamics. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) assume unilateral linking choice (directed network) and …nd that for high linking costs the e¢ cient action emerges and for low costs, the riskdominant action. In Jackson and Watts (2002) linking choice is bilateral (undirected graph) and the results are more ambiguous. Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) investigate the dynamics of imitation in a stag hunt game, relying on simulation techniques. Hojman and Szeidl (2006) also study the coevolution of networks and play when the underlying game is a Coordination game.
To our knowledge the coevolution of interaction structure and behavior in the Prisoners'Dilemma has not been studied analytically, maybe with the exception of few works in the literature on complex networks where mean-…eld techniques are used to study contagion of "bad" behaviors. 9 One reason is of course that if best response dynamics is used all outcomes will involve full defection, as defection is a dominant strategy in this game. A way to obtain a non-trivial situation is to study more bounded rational learning dynamics, such as imitation. There are several simulation works studying cooperation in endogenous networks. None of the existing studies, though, can explain why defectors are often found in the periphery of social networks. Simulation studies include Hanaki 7 Nowak, Bonhoe¤er and May (1994) have studied cooperation in local interaction models through simulations. 8 See also Alos-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) for a static analysis of Coordination Games. 9 Fosco, Marsili and Vega Redondo (2008), use a cluster mean-…eld approach to model contagion of misbehaviors. Incentives in their model do not correspond to a prisoner's dilemma, though. Ule (2005) simulates an interesting model of repeated interaction in which agents are forward-looking to some degree.
Also related are models of local search like Jackson and Rogers (2007) or Vázquez (2003) as well as models of preferential attachment (Barabási and Albert, 1999) , in which link imitation occurs without taking into account payo¤s explicitly. In the latter class of models highly connected agents are more likely to be chosen as new partners.
The Model
The Network
There are n agents, indexed by i, playing a bilateral Prisoners'Dilemma game with their neighbors in a network. The network is endogenous, i.e. players decide who to form links with. Denote l i = (l i1 ; :::l in ) the vector of linking decisions of player i, where l ij 2 f0; 1g. A link ij is formed whenever l ij l ji = 1, i.e. if and only if both players "wish" to have the link. Let it be a convention that l ii = 0, 8i = 1; ::n: The set of all linking decisions L = fl 1 ; :::l n g and the set of players (nodes) N = f1; :::ng jointly de…ne the network G = (N; L). Denote G a connected component of the network, i.e. a maximal subset of nodes s.t. 8i; j 2 there is a path joining them. 10 The components
G de…ne a partition of the network; no agent can be an element of two di¤erent components. Finally denote (i) the component that contains agent i and let 2 [1; :::; n] be the number of components of a network.
Interaction, Information and Search Radii
For any number h 2 N + we denote N h i the set of agents that are within a radius h of "geodesic" distance to agent i. 11 The set of …rst-order neighbors of any agent i is then denoted N 1 i = fj 6 = ijl ij l ji = 1g with cardinality n i . Note that the relation "j is an element of N h i " is symmetric, i.e. j 2 N h i , i 2 N h j . Interaction Radius Z. Interactions are not necessarily restricted to an agent's …rst-order neighbors. Denote N Z i the set of agents agent i interacts with (i.e. plays the bilateral Prisoner's Dilemma with) or the "interaction neighborhood" of player i. Here Z is an exogenous, …xed parameter. In some applications one may …nd it unnatural to interact with agents one is not directly linked with, in others though it seems natural. The model allows for either case.
Information Radius I. The interaction set N Z i will in general not coincide with the set of agents i has information about. Denote the latter set -the "information neighborhood" of agent i -by N I i : Again I is a …xed, exogenous parameter. When we say that i has information about j we mean that i knows j's average payo¤, degree, action choice and the identity of the other players that j interacts with. As an illustration consider agents on a line with interaction radius Z = 1 and information radius I = 2.
::::
Let it be a convention that N Z i does not contain the player i herself while N I i does -i.e. while players do not interact with themselves they have information about themselves. Of course both N I i and 10 A path between i and j is a …nite set of links connecting i and j. 11 The geodesic distance between two nodes in a graph is the number of edges on the shortest path connecting them.
N Z i vary endogenously with changes in the linking decisions of the agents. Denote n I i (t) (n Z i (t)) the cardinality of the set N I i (N Z i ) at time t. Search Radius I + Z. Revising their linking choices agents search for new partners within their search radius I + Z. Note that these are all the agents they know of, i.e. the agents they have information about (within radius I) as well as the interaction partners of these agents (within I + Z). N I+Z i denotes the corresponding set. As mentioned before the smaller Z and I the more important is the network for the outcome of the game and the learning process. As Z and I approach the diameter of the network, that is, the largest distance between any two nodes, we approach a global interaction setting.
The Game
Individuals play a one-shot symmetric 2 2 game with their interaction neighbors. The set of actions is given by fC; Dg for all players. For each pair of actions z i ; z j 2 fC; Dg the payo¤ i (z i ; z j ) that player i earns when playing action z i against an opponent who plays z j is given by the following matrix.
We are interested in the case c > a > d > b 0; i.e. the case where matrix (1) represents a Prisoners'Dilemma. We assume that all interactions are bene…cial (b > 0); i.e., irrespective of Z, all links are worthwhile. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) or Jackson and Watts (2002) have studied cases where not all links are worthwhile. In our model this is not a particularly interesting case to study, as (if b < 0) one would always …nd cooperators and defectors in di¤erent components and if d < 0 cooperation would obtain trivially. We also assume that a > b+c 2 , hence cooperation (C) is e¢ cient. The payo¤s at time t for player i from playing action z i when the network is G are given by 12
When choosing an action through the imitation learning process speci…ed below, agents are interested in the average payo¤ per interaction an action yields in their information neighborhood. This seems the appropriate measure as we assume that agents are myopic and thus choose actions not foreseeing that they might end up having more links in the future as a consequence of their action choice. Consequently they are interested in whether an action performs well in a given interaction irrespective of whether players choosing this action have many interaction partners or not. Average payo¤s (per interaction) for player i at time t are given by
In practice there are a large variety of factors (such as time and resource constraints) that limit the "linking capacity" of agents. We summarize such restrictions through the following simple assumption. Assumption 1: No agent can have more than 2 f3; ::ng links.
We assume that 2 to allow a connected network to form. What happens if = 2? In this case all connected graphs are circles or lines and, given the local nature of the search process, any rewiring of the network will quickly lead to the creation of triangles (thus it is not a very much appealing case). Assumption 1 can be rationalized through some strictly convex cost-functions for maintaining links. In the existing literature mostly constant marginal costs for forming links have been assumed with the consequence that equilibrium graphs were either complete or empty. 13 Our equilibrium networks will be more realistic than these, but of course still quite stylized. Before starting to describe the learning dynamics let us introduce some notation.
Sample
t k ( ) the average payo¤ per interaction of all agents contained in N I i at time t: Analogously denote t (N Z j \ N I i ) the average per interaction payo¤ of all agents in the set N Z j (t) \ N I i (t) at time t and t (N I i (z)) the average payo¤ per interaction enjoyed by all agents in N I i (t) that choose action z. Let it be a convention that
, the minimum payo¤ that player i obtains from any of her …rst-order neighbors.
Learning Dynamics
At each point in time t = 1; 2; 3:::: the state of the system is given by the vectors of actions and linking decisions of all agents
. Denote S the state space. Agents learn about optimal behavior through imitation. As is typical of payo¤-based imitation rules, agents substitute an action/link with another one after observing from others that this action/link yields higher payo¤s. More precisely in each period t the following happens.
1. agents are randomly selected to revise their action choice. Each agent i compares the average per interaction payo¤ in her information neighborhood of the two actions. If and only if t 1 (N I i (:z i )) > t 1 (N I i (z i )) she changes her action. 14 With small probability " she reverses her choice. 15 2. links ij with j 2 N I+Z i (t 1) are randomly selected for revision. If the link ij does not exist (ij = 2 G t 1 ) i and j are given the possibility to add it. With probability 1 the following decision rule is used. If i (t 1) < agent i chooses l ij = 1. If i (t 1) = agent i compares the average payo¤ of the agents interacting with j that she knows about, t 1 (N Z j \N I i ), to the payo¤ she derives from her "worst"link, t 1
, she chooses l ij = 1. Agent j goes through the symmetric process. If and only if l ij l ji = 1 the link ij is added. In this case if i(j) (t 1) = agent i (j) destroys her "worst"link.
With small probably a randomly chosen link is added or destroyed. Finally any node exceeding the linking constraint randomly severs one of her links.
The game (1) is played and agents receive the payo¤s.
Note that if Z > 1 the set N I+Z i nN 1 i contains agents that i is already interacting (i.e. playing) with, even if they are not currently linked with her. Why would she want to form links with these agents at all? The reason is that any such agent can give i access to other agents. The payo¤ that other agents linked to j obtain ( t 1 (N Z j \ N I i )) is a proxy for the payo¤ that i can expect from being linked to j. Of course more complicated decision rules could be modeled, as depending on the node in question agents might or might not have more and better information to evaluate whether a link is worthwhile. We chose to stick to the simple formulation here. (If Z = 1 this issue does of course not arise).
To …nish this subsection we want to discuss how I and Z a¤ect the two dimensions of the learning dynamics. Of course the larger I the more information agents have. If I Z is large the information about the payo¤s of the two actions will be of a more "global" nature as N I i (z) will re ‡ect less the local topology i faces. Under this condition it is also likely, though, that the two sets N Z j and N Z j \N I i coincide i.e. that the information agents have about potential new partners is more precise. If I Z is small information about action payo¤s will strongly re ‡ect the local topology but information about potential new partners will be less precise.
Techniques used in the Analysis
The learning process described in Subsection 2.3 gives rise to a …nite Markov chain, for which the standard techniques apply. Denote P 0 (s; s 0 ) the transition probability for a transition from state s to s 0 whenever " = = 0 and P " (s; s 0 ) the transition probability of the perturbed Markov process with strictly positive trembles ("; ). We make the following assumption on noise. Assumption 2: " = for some constant > 0. 16 An absorbing set under P 0 is a minimal subset of states which, once entered is never left. An absorbing state is a singleton absorbing set, or in other words De…nition 1 State s is absorbing , P 0 (s; s) = 1.
As (given that " > 0) trembles make transitions between any two states possible, the perturbed Markov process is irreducible and hence ergodic, i.e. it has a unique stationary distribution denoted " : This distribution summarizes both the long-run behavior of the process and the time-average of the sample path independently of the initial conditions. 17 The limit invariant distribution = lim "!0 " exists and its support fs 2 Sj lim "!0 " (s) > 0g is a union of some absorbing sets of the unperturbed process. The limit invariant distribution singles out a stable prediction of the unperturbed dynamics (" = 0) in the sense that for any " > 0 small enough the play approximates that described by in the long run. The states in the support of are called stochastically stable states.
De…nition 2 State s is stochastically stable , (s) > 0: Young (1993) has shown that stochastically stable states have the property that they minimize the sum of mutations necessary to induce a transition to s from any alternative absorbing state. The intuition behind Young's result is simple. In the long run the process will spend most of the time in one of its absorbing states. The stochastic potential of any state s is a measure of how easy it is to jump from the basin of attraction of other absorbing states to the basin of attraction of state s by perturbing the process through mutations. 18 
Analysis
We …rst characterize the set of absorbing states of the dynamic process. We then provide a characterization of the set of stochastically stable outcomes.
Absorbing States
Our …rst proposition has three parts. The …rst part places restrictions on the topology of the networks that can arise in an absorbing state. Due to our di¤erent assumption on linking constraints these restrictions will be weaker than those obtained in previous works on the coevolution of behavior and interaction structure. 19 On the other hand we will observe richer and more interesting network topologies. The second and third part of the proposition characterize action choices.
(ii) States where graphs display only monomorphic components and where (i) holds are absorbing.
(iii) There exists b Z(I) and a set of payo¤ parameters (I; Z) 6 = ? s.t. 8Z b Z(I) polymorphic components arise in absorbing states (or sets) whenever payo¤s are contained in (I; Z). In these components the shortest path between any two cooperators never involves a defector.
Proof. Appendix.
If an agent i is not link constrained either all her potential partners must be so or her search set N I+Z i must be empty. Essentially condition (i) says that agents will maintain as many links as they can. If this condition holds it is also quite obvious that states where all agents choose the same action are absorbing, as well as polymorphic states where agents that choose di¤erent actions are found in di¤erent components of the network (ii).
Part (iii) of Proposition 1 is the most interesting one. It shows that "truly"polymorphic absorbing states exist, in which cooperators and defectors are in the same component and interact with each other. The fact that the shortest path between any two cooperators cannot involve a defector immediately implies that in all such components the center always consists of cooperators, while defectors are found at the periphery. (But not all components where this is the case are part of an absorbing state). In these polymorphic states, thus, defectors are not fully excluded from interactions with cooperators, but instead are marginalized at the periphery of the component. The conditions on the payo¤ parameters ensure that no agent is willing to imitate the other action. Naturally there must also exist an upper bound on the interaction radius Z for which such states can be absorbing. If Z is "too"large relative to I peripheral defectors will interact with "too many"cooperators, increasing their average payo¤ (and making defection an attractive action to imitate). Also of course if Z is too large we approach a scenario where all agents interact, i.e. where the network does not matter anymore for matching. Naturally in this case defection, being a dominant strategy, will always yield higher payo¤s. A special case is given whenever Z = 1 or I 2: In these cases (as we show in the O " max s 0 2 X(s 0 ;s) where max s 0 2 X(s 0 ; s) is the maximum over all states of the smallest number of mutations needed to reach state s: The resulting wait time can be quite long, which is a criticism often brought forward to this type of models. Note though that -as in our model both action and link imitation occur on a purely local level -the speed of convergence is independent of the size of the population. Instead, it depends on I and Z. 19 The topology most often observed in this literature is the complete graph. See Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) or Jackson and Watts (2002). appendix) neighboring defectors must form a clique, i.e. they must all be linked to each other (see Figure 1 ).
Figures 2a -2c illustrate how defectors are driven to the periphery as the imitation dynamics unfolds. Why do polymorphic components need to have this particular structure? This is largely a consequence of local search. First note that any cooperator i linked to a defector k is always willing to substitute this link for a link with one of k's interaction neighbors (irrespective of the action that agent is taking). 20 If such a neighbor j 2 N 1 k is herself defecting she will want to link with i, if (except for i) she observes only defectors. In this case t (N Z i \ N I j ) > min (N 1 j ). The link ji will be established and the links ik and jk will be severed. Repeating the argument it can be shown that any two cooperators connected through a path of defectors will at some point …nd each other and form a link. But then defectors will eventually end up in the periphery of the component. Note that because of the local search process, where agents meet each other explicitly through common neighbors, all graphs will display a high degree of clustering. We will illustrate this process in the following mini-network of 10 players (Figure 3 ). In the mini-network the white nodes 1,4,5,7 and 10 are cooperators and the remaining players defectors. For the sake of illustration we want to uniquely focus on link-imitation. Hence we are holding the actions of these players constant. In the mini-network each player is constraint to have at most 3 links. We assume that I = Z = 1. Note also that initially the defectors are more central, in the sense that the shortest path between any two defectors does never involve a cooperator. Now we would like to show how this reverses and how all cooperators do …nd each other. Assume that initially players 2 and 4 can form the link 24. Both players will have incentives to do so. The cooperator 4 is not linking-constraint, but even if she were she would prefer to cut a link with a defector for the link 24 which promises her a payo¤ of c+2d 3 , the same that it promises to player 2 through their mutual acquaintance player 3. 21 Hence player 2 is willing to cut a link to say player 6. Similarly, if players 8 and 10 are o¤ered to link they will …nd it in their interest to do. If next, players 1 and 4 and players 20 Note that the payo¤ she obtains from the defector min (N 1
no matter what action j is taking, as j is linked to at least one defector i knows about (namely her own …rst-order neighbor). is the average per interaction payo¤ of player 3. Since it is the sole element of the set N Z 4 \ N I 2 , it is also the relevant sample payo¤ against which player 2 compares her worst link's value, i.e. d. 7 and 10 are respectively o¤ered to link, they will …nd it again convenient to do so and so on. 22 The remaining …gures show how all cooperators end up linked to each other and how defectors end up in the periphery. 23 (In the last picture of Figure 3 the nodes have been rearranged). Note that here defectors are not "more in the periphery than cooperators", but this is simply due to the small number of agents in our mininetwork. The big networks in Figures 2a-2c show the more realistic picture. The mini-network is intended to make the reader understand how the process of unraveling works and to see why a situation where cooperators are separated from each other through a path of defectors cannot be stable. This string assortativity arises even if initially these cooperators are not in each other's search set.
Stochastically Stable States
Proposition 1 delimits the set of states that can potentially be stochastically stable, since (as explained in Subsection 2.5) every such state must be absorbing for the unperturbed dynamics. Of course we are ultimately interested in the set of stochastically stable states. Our main result is Proposition 2. Proof. Appendix. Stochastically stable states are either polymorphic or characterized by full defection. If I + Z > 2 monomorphic states are connected and polymorphic states consist of two monomorphic components. A su¢ cient condition for polymorphic states to emerge is that the payo¤ for joint cooperation be high enough. How high that depends on the number of links each node can maintain and on the information (I) and interaction radii (Z). If in addition I + Z > 2, then all stochastically stable states will consist of two monomorphic components, one of defectors and one of cooperators. In these cases there is full exclusion. If I + Z = 2 on the other hand, graphs in stochastically stable states can be "truly"polymorphic, displaying a structure where defectors are marginalized, like that illustrated in Figure 1 or 2c .
What is the intuition for this result? The tension in the Prisoners'Dilemma arises from the fact that while defection is a dominant strategy, cooperation provides the highest bene…t to a community (is e¢ cient). This is all the more so the higher the payo¤ parameter a 2 (d; c). Cooperation then will emerge as a stable outcome of the imitation learning process if cooperators interact with increased probability among themselves, i.e. if there is strong assortativity. This reveals the social bene…t of cooperation and induces other agents to imitate cooperators. The most extreme situation is a state 22 When the link 14 is created, player 4 cuts the link to player 2. Players 7 and 10 form the link after both severe their respective links to player 8. 23 The link 29 is created (neither is linking constraint); players 5 and 10 link after player 10 cuts the link to 9. Finally, player 1 cuts the link to player 2 and player 5 cuts the link to player 6 in order to connect each other (i.e. link 15 is created).
where cooperators and defectors coexist in two di¤erent components of the network. Two forces in our model facilitate that the process arrives at such a situation. Firstly as action imitation occurs among one's information neighbors only, defection will spread locally. Secondly as new links are searched locally (at a radius of I + Z), cooperators can avoid the interaction with defectors in their interaction neighborhood by cutting these links and linking up with other cooperators. Of course if the defector payo¤s are "too high"cooperators will easily tend to imitate defectors and cooperative components can easily be destabilized. But what does "high"mean exactly? This depends of course on the relative size of the interaction and information radius (Z; I) as well as on the number of links each node can maintain.
The relative size of the information radius I (relative to Z) has a double e¤ect on the dynamic process. A smaller information radius I (relative to Z) forces defection to spread more "locally" and thus helps cooperation by forcing defectors to interact among each other. On the other hand a higher information radius I (relative to Z) improves the information agents have about potential partners inside their search radius (I + Z) making it more easy for them to exclude defectors from bene…cial interactions with cooperators. The density of the network (i.e. the number of nodes each agent can maintain ) a¤ects the size of the agent's sample (given Z and I) and consequently tends to exacerbate the e¤ects described before. 24 Why do we obtain few (at most two) disconnected components in stochastically stable states ? Note that one linking tremble su¢ ces to connect any two disconnected components in which agents choose the same actions. But then any connected (monomorphic) state can be obtained from any other monomorphic state through a sequence of "one-trembles."It is a standard result, that if a state s is reached from another state s 0 via one tremble then s cannot have higher stochastic potential than s 0 . From this observation, it is then a small step to show that -as some connected components are very unlikely to "break apart" (if I + Z > 2) -all stochastically stable states must have graphs with few components.
Next we would like to address the question of why with a larger search radius societies tend to be disconnected while if I + Z = 2 they are connected? The intuition is as follows. Note that in the process of marginalization of defectors there are always some cooperators which are in a rather bad situation since they are interacting with several defectors (see Figure 1 ). On the other hand their role in society is important since they build a bridge between cooperators and defectors. With a larger search radius now agents are able to link up to more distant partners and hence those cooperators in such situation will …nd it easier to …nd other partners to link to. This tends to lead to separation of cooperators and defectors. The sharp transition at I + Z > 2 arises, since whenever I + Z = 2 even if bridging cooperators (e.g. because of an action tremble in the network) link up to a new interaction partner, they will always link up with a neighbour of their "bridge contact", with who they will severe the link. This process can occur repeatedly but will get stuck in a cycle. If I + Z > 2 on the other hand bridging cooperators (after a tremble in the network) can keep linking up with new agents until they …nd another bridging cooperator. Once they have found such a cooperator and linked up with him the two components will split.
Note that there is also some role of the capacity constraint. First note that capacity constraints are a natural assumption, since they re ‡ect convex linking costs. Without capacity constraints (and if b > 0) agents will never …nd it optimal to cut any link and hence the unperturbed dynamics will always lead to the complete network (once the network is connected). But then it is clear that the complete network will arise in all stochastically stable states, since it can be obtained via a chain of one-trembles from any other absorbing state, while the reverse is clearly not true. With respect to actions, we will …nd that universal defection is the only outcome in this case. The reason is that the 24 The e¤ect of parameters I and Z will be illustrated further in our simulations in Section 4. only e¤ective means that cooperators have to create some assortative matching relies on exclusion of defectors. If no links are ever cut, though, then the unperturbed dynamics cannot create such assortative matching. Hence a single tremble to defection will induce defection in the whole network.
A related question is what would happen if agents searched for new links globally. Note that as in this case the sets N Z j \ N I i can be empty an additional rule is needed to evaluate potential new links. Irrespective of the speci…c form of such an additional rule, though, the results with global search will change. Several simulations we performed show that the process tends to full defection in this case. Hence both local search together with capacity constraints are crucial ingredients of the model.
Finally one may wonder whether connected or disconnected societies yield higher welfare. This will depend on the assumptions we make on the payo¤ parameters, in particular on whether a + d R b + c; i.e. whether homogeneous links yield higher payo¤s than heterogenous links given that the number of cooperators and defectors is the same.
We have seen that while fully cooperative states will not be observed polymorphic states can often occur. The condition needed is that the payo¤ for joint cooperation is high enough, where the last quali…cation depends on many parameters of the model. The aim of the next section is to develop a better intuition for the role of our di¤erent model parameters.
Simulation Results
In this section we illustrate and complement the analytical results through simulations. We explore essentially two aspects. First (under payo¤ parameters where polymorphic structures are "likely" to emerge) we show the e¤ect of ( = ), I and Z on the fraction of cooperators denoted by ' c . We address this question separately for I + Z > 2 and I + Z = 2. The di¤erence between both cases is that when I + Z > 2, stochastically stable polymorphic states are always composed of two separate components. If I + Z = 2, there can be stochastically stable states with polymorphic components, like those illustrated in Figure 1 . Second, we measure the e¤ect of the search radius (I + Z) on the topology of the network, in particular with respect to average clustering and average distance within components.
In all the simulations that we report here there are n = 400 nodes. The initial network is random with n 2 links and satis…es i , = 4. The initial number of cooperators is 0:5n (randomly placed on the network). Payo¤ parameters are chosen such that for any I; Z; ( = ) polymorphic structures are "very likely"to emerge (c = 1; a = 0:9; d = 0:01; b = 0). We choose = 1 and 2 [1; 10]\N. The combinations of (I; Z) analyzed are f(1; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (1; 3) ; (2; 1) ; (3; 1)g. Simulations include (small) noises " and and t max = 4 10 4 . For each case, we perform 100 realizations of the dynamic process, and for each realization ' c is the average of the fractions of cooperators in the last 2 10 3 time steps. 25 Result 1 If I + Z = 2, all realizations converge to a network where the largest component consists of a core of cooperators with defectors lying on the periphery. 26 The parameter has almost no e¤ect on the fraction of cooperators (see the table below). 27 25 t max is the total number of timesteps of each simulation. t eq is the timestep s.t. the system approximately equilibrates. We chose t max = t eq + 2000: t eq depends on (I; Z). For small noises v = 10 4 and " = 1 2 10 4 , we found by inspection of the time series of ' c , that t eq < 3 10 4 . Since this is a very imperfect measure because it is only considering action convergence, we set t max = 4 10 4 in all cases that we report here. (Note, however, that our Result 2 is related to action convergence). 26 In Figures 2a-2c we have showed a typical example. 27 Intervals are asymptotic, with ' c 2 b ' c 1:96 The intuition for this result is as follows. If I + Z = 2 imitation of the defective action will necessarily lead defectors to interact with each other reducing their average payo¤. The action imitation dynamics itself is able to limit the spread of defection. Irrespective of the value of defection in general invades a small group of agents. The linking dynamics then "locates" these defectors at the periphery of the network, but naturally exclusion ( ) is not necessary in maintaining higher levels of cooperation.
Result 2 If I + Z > 2 the fraction of cooperators increases with and tends to increase with Z and decrease with I.
To illustrate this result, we show in the next table the intervals for ' c and in Figure 2 What is the intuition for this result? If I + Z > 2 higher values of increase the fraction of cooperators. Since action imitation in these cases allows for the infection of "many" agents with defection, exclusion ( ) is very e¤ective in raising the number of cooperators. Consider …rst the cases I = 1 and Z > I (panels (a), (b), (e)). Cooperation has good chances, as the small information radius forces defectors to interact with each other after action imitation. On the other hand though (as Z (and thus Z + I) is "large"relative to I) the quality of information about potential new links is relatively bad and the linking dynamics leads to more "erroneous"new links reducing the e¤ectiveness of the exclusion mechanism. This is why the e¤ect of is relatively less important in the case Z > I compared to the case where I > Z: Now consider the case where Z = 1 and I > Z (panels (c), (d), (f)). Clearly, being informed is not per se good for cooperation. Indeed, since agents imitate average behavior in this radius, the higher is I the more probable is that a cooperator imitates defection. On the other hand if the exclusion mechanism works (high ), the linking dynamics is more accurate due to the higher quality of information and less "erroneous" choices are made. Inspecting overall cooperation rates, it can be seen clearly that the negative e¤ect of I on the action imitation process dominates the positive e¤ect of I on cooperation through the linking dynamics. The latter e¤ect though explains that has a higher "marginal" e¤ect in the cases where I > Z (compared with I < Z). Next we want to show some results on topology. Result 3 con…rms our intuition about some of the topological features of the components created by the dynamics. Of course, given the homogenous capacity constraint, the degree distribution is approximately degenerate. Average clustering ( c (i)) and average distance ( d (i)) are both decreasing with the search radius I + Z. The search radius represents the extent of the locality in linking dynamics. When I + Z is low, the probability that two …rst neighbors of any agent i are connected themselves is very high, but since links are concentrated within a small radius, the average distance between two nodes is large. When I + Z is high, since each agent has more possible partners, the probability of choosing a second neighbor decreases (and so does the average clustering). But on the other hand links with nodes that are relative far away are shortcuts that reduce average distances. Note that these features are independent of and on the particular combination of I and Z.
Conclusions
We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners'Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners through payo¤-based imitation. We …nd that polymorphic states evolve under a wide range of parameters. Whenever agents hold some information beyond their interaction partners defectors and cooperators will never interact in stochastically stable states, i.e. they are found in disconnected components. Otherwise graphs in stochastically stable states can consist of a core of cooperators with defectors lying on the periphery of the component. Consistently with empirical …ndings on social networks, the networks we obtain display high clustering coe¢ cients, short average distances, strong assortative matching and explain the empirical …nding that agents with less altruistic behaviors are less central in social networks. Two directions of further research seem promising to us. On the one hand it would be interesting to explore the link between information, behavior and network position also in controlled empirical settings. Also of some interest is how (if at all) predictions of existing models that have analyzed coordination games with best response dynamics change when more bounded rational learning rules (like our imitation rule) are used.
[42] Zimmermann, M. G. and V. M. Eguíluz (2005), Cooperation, social networks, and the emergence of leadership in a prisoners' dilemma with adaptive local interactions, Physical Review E 72, 056118.
A Appendix: Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1: Proof. (i) If i < potential partners for i have to be link constrained, i.e. 8j 2 N I+Z i nN 1 i : j = : Else i and j would form a link. (ii) States with monomorphic components only, where (i) holds, are absorbing, as no agent has "possibilities to imitate," as card N I i (:z i ) = 0. (iii) We …rst consider incentives to change links and show that in any absorbing state there cannot exist two cooperators i and i 0 separated by a path of defectors of any length. If i 0 2 N I+Z i , i and i 0 will form a link. If not, cooperator i will form a link with defector j 0 at distance of at most I + Z. This link ij 0 will be formed because the cooperator is always willing to severe a link with a defector. On the other hand defector j 0 (connected to i through some path of defectors) is willing to form a link with i, whenever N Z i \ N I j 0
contains only defectors, as in this case t 1 min (N 1
Repeating this argument it can be seen that the distance between i and i 0 gets shorter and shorter until …nally i 0 2 N I+Z i : But then i and i 0 will link and all mixed links will eventually be cut. It follows analogously that each defector j must lie at a distance of at most I + Z from cooperator i.
Next we show that such states are indeed absorbing under the conditions in Proposition 1 (iii). A su¢ cient condition is that defectors form a clique (i.e. are all linked with each other). If either I 2 or Z = 1 this is also a necessary condition. We start with linking deviations. Assume that either I = 1 or Z = 1 and that there is only one cooperator i linked to some of a set of defectors. Any defector at a distance of at most I + Z has incentives to link to cooperator i. If I = 1, defectors observe only defectors interacting with cooperator i. But then t 1 min (N 1
.
If I > 1, any defector may observe in addition cooperators other than i, but since Z = 1 these cooperators interact only with cooperators and again t 1
. Thus new links might be formed. This rewiring can be part of a recurrent set if and only if N I+Z i remains unchanged. It follows that the set of defectors must form a clique. Now assume I > 1 and Z > 1.
Again cooperator i has incentives to sever any of her mixed links. The incentives of i's potential partners depend on how many cooperators interact with the defectors they observe. To characterize all structures in this case is impossible without further assumptions.
Finally consider agents'incentives to change actions. Assume that x defectors form a clique and that there is only one cooperator i linked with them. 29 We show that there exists a threshold for the interaction radius, b Z(I) such that if Z < b Z(I) there always exist values of the payo¤ parameters for which such an action pro…le is absorbing. To simplify the exposition we normalize c = 1 and b = 0. It should be clear that if i does not want to change action, then no other cooperator h has incentives to do so. For cooperator i and any defector j in the clique, 
On the other hand for Z very large,
Consequently there exists a threshold value b Z(I), such that if Z < b Z there always exists payo¤ parameters for which there are no incentives to imitate actions. 30 s trees For most of the following proofs we will rely on the graph-theoretic techniques developed by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) . 31 They can be summarized as follows. For any state s an s tree is a directed network on the set of absorbing states , whose root is s and such that there is a unique directed path joining any other s 0 2 to s: For each arrow s 0 ! s 00 in any given s tree the "cost"of the arrow is de…ned as the minimum number of simultaneous trembles necessary to reach s 00 from s 0 . 29 Of course x 2 has to hold. 30 Note also that j (d ! a) = (x 1)a+1
x > a > j (N I j (C)) (no intersection). 31 See also Young (1993 Young ( , 1998 .
The cost of the tree is obtained by adding up the costs of all its arrows and the stochastic potential of a state s is de…ned as the minimum cost across all s trees.
Denote by ! the union of one or more absorbing sets and the set of all absorbing sets. De…ne X(!; ! 0 ) the minimal number of mutations (simultaneous " trembles) necessary to reach ! 0 from !. The stochastic potential (s) of a state s 2 is de…ned as the sum of minimal mutations necessary to induce a (possibly indirect) transition to s from any alternative state s 0 2 ; i.e.
(s) = P s 0 2 X(s 0 ; s):
Result (Young 1993) State s is stochastically stable if it has minimal stochastic potential, i.e. if s 2 arg min s2 (s):
Lemma 1 (Topology) If I + Z > 2, all polymorphic stochastically stable states will consist of at most two disconnected components and all monomorphic stochastically stable states will be connected.
Proof. Let G 0 denote the set of graphs consisting of at most two disconnected components. Let G 1 be the set of graphs one tremble away from some network in G 0 : De…ne G 2 to be graphs not in G 0 [ G 1 that are one tremble away from G 1 : For > 2 let G denote graphs not in G j for any j < ; that are one tremble from G 1 : Note that these exhaust all graphs that could be part of absorbing sets.
Consider an absorbing state graph G 2 G ; > 0: Transitions from G to some G 0 2 G 1 can occur after just one tremble, as it is always possible that two players i and h; with (i) 6 = (h) and z i = z h form a link by mistake. This implies that for any s with G 2 G ; there exists s 0 with G 0 2 G 1 s.t. (s 0 ) (s): (Starting from an s tree one can always redirect an arrow from s to a state s 0 which is one tremble away). Thus to complete the proof we show (i) that the stochastic potential of states with a graph in G 0 is smaller than that of states with a graph in G 1 and (ii) that the stochastic potential of connected monomorphic states is smaller than that of monomorphic states where graphs consist of two disconnected components. Start with an absorbing state s with G 2 G 1 and …nd a state s 0 with graph G 0 2 G 0 : We know that X(s; s 0 ) = 1 and of course X(s 0 ; s) 1:
We will now see in which cases strict inequality obtains. Consider …rst the transition through which s 0 is reached from s: For this transition a link ih is formed by mistake between i and h s.t. (i) 6 = (h) and z i = z h : If now i and h have neighbors, say j and k, that are not linking constrained, then, whenever I + Z > 2; (at least) the link jk will be formed before an absorbing state is reached. But then at least two trembles are needed for the transition s 0 ! s and consequently X(s 0 ; s) > 1: Note that such two states s 0 and s can always be found. What happens if for two states s with G 2 G 1 and s 0 with graph G 0 2 G 0 we have that X(s 0 ; s) = 1? First note that for any s 0 a state s 00 with G 00 2 G 0 can be found such that a) X(s 00 ; s) > 1 and b) s 0 can be reached from s 00 via a series of "one-trembles." But then we have that (s 0 ) (s 00 ). Focus thus on states s 0 with graph G 0 2 G 0 where X(s 0 ; s) > 1 and X(s 0 ; s) = 1 for some state s with G 2 G 1 : Then starting from a minimal s tree, add an arrow s ! s 0 : Consider the old path s 0 ! s and take the …rst s 000 on that path (this could be s 0 ) such that the arrow pointing away from s 000 involves at least two trembles. Cut this arrow. Note that such a state s 000 must exist because at some point (at least) two links have to be severed to separate the component of players. 32 (In e¤ect, s 000 must have a graph in G 0 and to separate the component at least two trembles will be needed: any two agents i and h such that in s : (i) 6 = (h) who cut a link starting from s 0 will be in each other's search radius and thus for s 000 to be absorbing either have to form a link (but then s 0 = s 000 ) or either of them has to form a link with another agent). Then starting from an s tree we have created an s 0 tree, by cutting an arrow with a "cost" exceeding two and adding an arrow with a cost of one. Consequently we have shown that for any s with G 2 32 Note that if starting from s 0 the component is separated at least two trembles are needed and thus s 0 = s 000 : G 1 there exists a state s 000 with graph G 000 2 G 0 s.t. (s 000 ) < (s): The argument can be repeated starting from a monomorphic state s with two disconnected components. This completes the proof.
In the following we will denote ! z the set of absorbing states where all agents play action z and where the network consists of disconnected components. Denote [ 2f1;::ng ! z = ! z . Analogously ! CD is the set of all polymorphic absorbing states with components.
Lemma 2 (Instability of Full Cooperation) States s 2 ! C , where all agents cooperate, are not stochastically stable.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that if stochastically stable states that involve full cooperation exist at least one of them has to be connected, i.e. has to be contained in the set ! C 1 . We will now show that for any s 2 ! C 1 there exists an alternative state in ! CD that has strictly less stochastic potential. For any s 2 ! D consider the state s 0 2 ! CD reached via one tremble from s in the following way. Assume one player i trembles and switches to action D: Then for all agents j 2 N I i the average payo¤ of action D will exceed that of action C: Assume agents selected from that set switch to action D and that the subgraph containing these agents is cut o¤ (through rewiring of cooperating neighbors who prefer being linked to a cooperator) only after D > agents in total (including the mutant) have switched to D: Note that irrespective of the payo¤ parameters and of I and Z this is always possible. State s 0 contains thus two disconnected components, one consisting of D > defectors and one of n D cooperators. The reverse transition (s 0 ! s) will need at least 2 trembles, as one link tremble has to occur to merge the two components and in addition at least one of the defectors has to tremble to switch to cooperation. (Note again that any single (non-isolated) defector will have a higher per interaction payo¤ than cooperators). Next take a minimal s tree and add the arrow s ! s 0 at a cost of X(s; s 0 ) = 1: Then consider the path s 0 ! s: If there is no other state on this path, cut the arrow s 0 ! s. This yields an s 0 tree with (s 0 ) < (s): If there is a state s 00 2 ! C on this path, then we know that X(s 0 ; s 00 ) 2 (because a single cooperator in a component of defectors will never be imitated). We can cut the arrow s 0 ! s 00 and have constructed again an s 0 tree with (s 0 ) < (s): If s 00 2 ! CD then we know that X(s 00 ; s) 2 by the same argument as above. Cutting the arrow s 00 ! s leaves us with a s 00 tree that has (s 00 ) < (s): This completes the proof.
Distance between graphs
Before stating the next proof let us introduce the following metric. De…ne y(G; G 0 ) = P ij j(lijlji) (l 0 ij l 0 ji )j 2 to be the distance between the graphs G and G 0 associated with states s and s 0 respectively. The distance y(G; G 0 ) between two graphs simply measures the number of links that di¤er between the two graphs. 33 Furthermore denote Z i (t) the share of agents j; k 2 N Z i at time t that are Z -th order neighbors themselves. Z i (t) is a measure of local clustering in i's interaction neighborhood. as follows. Assume that d C e agents (where C 2 R) tremble and switch to action C at time t: We want to consider the action choice of a defector k linked with a cooperator i: Assume that all other cooperators are (1st ; 2nd ....Zth order) neighbors of i; i.e. are all interacting with i. The sample payo¤ of cooperation that agent k observes is given by t (N I k (C)) = b + (a b)h( C ; n Z ; Z i (t)) where h( ) is an increasing function of clustering and of C . On the other hand the sample payo¤ of defection that agent k observes is given by t (N I k (D)) = d + (c d)g( C ; n Z ; Z i (t)) where g( ) is a decreasing function of clustering and of C . Denote the value of C that solves t (N I k (C)) = t (N I k (D)) by C : This value is in general a complicated expression but note that (@ C =@a) < 0. Now whenever agent k has incentives to switch to cooperation (i.e. whenever t (N I k (C)) > t (N I k (D))) then x C n Z + 1 C agents can be infected through the ensuing operation of the unperturbed action dynamics alone. Through the operation of the unperturbed linking dynamics, all cooperators will sever their remaining links with defectors and form links among each other. (Note that this is possible because x C + C + 1 so these agents can always at least form the complete component. Furthermore they have incentives to do so, as t min (N 1 h ) = b < t (N Z j \ N I h ) for any pair of cooperating agents j; h. Note also that by construction all these agents are in each other's search set).
(ii) Consider the reverse transition from s 0 2 ! CD 2 to s 2 ! D 1 . Essentially such a transition can occur in two ways. Either the cooperative component C (s 0 ) is …rst infected by defection and then the graph is rewired to obtain state s. (In this case the transition is indirect, i.e. passes through other absorbing states among which at least one is in ! D 2 .) Or …rst a su¢ cient number of linking trembles has to occur s.t. the ensuing operation of the unperturbed dynamics permits infecting all agents with defection while rewiring the graph. (In this case the transition is direct).
Consider the …rst type of transition. For this transition Act: each other and want form a link. Consequently y(G(s iv ); G(s 000 )) 2. But then starting from a minimal s iv tree adding the arrow s iv ! s 000 and cutting the arrow from the last state on the path (s 000 ; ::::s iv ) yields an s 000 tree with (s 000 ) < (s iv ) (s 00 ) (s): Proof of Proposition 2: Proof. Lemma 2 shows that fully cooperative states are not stochastically stable. Take any two states s 2 ! D 1 and s 0 2 ! CD 2 with X(s; s 0 ) < X(s 0 ; s) (such states always exist if a > b a as we have seen in Lemma 3). Starting from a minimal s tree consider the path from s 0 to s. Denote this path by (s 0 ; :::; s). We know from the proof of Lemma 3 that no state on this path will be contained in ! C or ! CD (with the exception of the state s 0 ). a) If (s 0 ; :::; s) = (s 0 ; s) i.e. if the transition from s 0 to s is direct we can infer immediately that (s 0 ) < (s). (Just redirect the arrow s 0 ! s: This yields an s 0 tree with (s 0 ) = (s) + [X(s; s 0 ) X(s 0 ; s)] < (s)). b) Next assume that there exists a state s 00 2 (s 0 ; :::; s) with s 00 2 ! D 2 : Note that X(s 00 ; s) > X(s; s 0 ) always holds under the assumption that a > a ( ), as can be read from the proof of Lemma 3. But if X(s 00 ; s) > X(s; s 0 ) we can …nd an s 00 tree with (s 00 ) < (s) simply adding the arrow s ! s 0 and deleting the arrow s 00 ! s: Thus s cannot be stochastically stable. On the other hand it follows from Lemma 1 that states in ! D where > 1 cannot be stochastically stable either. (c) Furthermore it follows from the proof of Lemma 3 that whenever the path (s 0 ; :::; s) in a minimal s tree contains a state s 000 2 ! D 1 ; it also contains a state s 00 2 ! D 2 : But we have already seen that in this case s is not stochastically stable. Consequently all stochastically stable states are contained in ! CD where 2. The remaining results follow directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 4.
